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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3529 
 ___________ 
 
 HECTOR HUERTAS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 RAYMOND J. SOBINA, SUPERINTENDENT; 
DAN HENRY, MAILROOM SUPERVISOR; 
DORINA VARNER, CHIEF SECRETARY  
OF INMATE GRIEVANCES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-00139) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 20, 2012 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 20, 2012) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Hector Huertas, a Pennsylvania prisoner, appeals from the District Court’s order 
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granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Dan Henry, against whom 
Huertas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm. 
I 
 At all times relevant to this action, Huertas was a prisoner confined in the 
restricted housing unit (“RHU”) at the State Correctional Institution in Albion, 
Pennsylvania (“SCI-Albion”).  In 2009 Huertas filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against three Pennsylvania Department of Corrections employees:  SCI-Albion 
Superintendent Raymond Sobina; Chief Secretary of Inmate Grievances Dorina Varner; 
and SCI-Albion mailroom supervisor Dan Henry.  The defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss, which the District Court granted in part.  As a result, Sobina and Varner were 
dismissed from the action, leaving only two claims against Henry. 
 With regard to the remaining claims against Henry, Huertas first alleged that on 
three separate occasions (in January, February, and August 2008), Henry opened, read, 
and returned to Huertas letters that he had written to his bank.  Huertas alleged that this 
conduct violated his First Amendment rights.  Thereafter, Huertas filed a number of 
administrative grievances related to the perceived problems with his mail.  Second, 
Huertas alleged that because he pursued these complaints, Henry unlawfully retaliated 
against him by interfering with and taking contents from his mail. 
 After the parties completed discovery, during which Huertas was deposed, Henry 
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District Court granted over Huertas’s 
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objections.  Huertas now appeals from that decision.
1
 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and may affirm on any 
grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2001).  “Our review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we 
must apply the same standard the district court was required to apply under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56[].”  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 
2010).  “Thus, we can affirm only ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting former 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)).  “A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient 
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”  Id.  
“In evaluating the evidence, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
 With regard to Huertas’s claims that Henry interfered with his three letters to the 
bank, the District Court reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate because there 
was no evidence in the record that Henry was personally involved in the alleged 
mishandling of the letters.  We agree.  “‘A[n individual government] defendant in a civil 
                                                 
1
  Huertas raises no challenge to the District Court’s earlier order dismissing his action 
against Sobina and Varner. 
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rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot 
be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.  Personal involvement can 
be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence.’”  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).  As the District Court explained in 
some detail, the evidence in the record -- particularly Huertas’s deposition answers -- 
demonstrated that, as an RHU resident, Huertas had no first-hand knowledge of what 
took place in the mailroom, and that he was unable to produce any evidence whatsoever 
showing that Henry interfered with the bank letters, directed his subordinates to do so, or 
acquiesced in any misconduct.
2
 
 Likewise, the District Court properly granted summary judgment with respect to 
Huertas’s retaliation claim.  Prison officials may be held liable for retaliatory conduct that 
was motivated “‘in substantial part by a desire to punish [the prisoner] for exercise of a 
constitutional right,’” Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)), such as filing 
lawsuits and grievances related to the conditions of incarceration.  See Mitchell v. Horn, 
318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003); Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981).  
                                                 
2
  In the same vein, we agree with the District Court that two general statements 
Henry made to Huertas in 2006 and 2007 that he “inspect[s] RHU mail and you 
receive more than any other inmate down there,” and that he “handles the RHU mail” 
were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Henry 
mishandled Huertas’s letters to the bank in 2008. 
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To prevail on a retaliation claim, the prisoner must prove:  (1) that the conduct leading to 
the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected; (2) that he suffered an adverse 
action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional 
rights; and (3) that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
decision to discipline him.  See Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  Here, 
Huertas alleged that because he pursued administrative grievances, Henry:  (1) took 
photographs from a letter sent by Huertas’s brother; (2) interfered with Huertas’s receipt 
of a magazine subscription and related correspondences; (3) interfered with letters to and 
from a pen pal service Huertas subscribed to; (4) took letters and photographs sent by and 
to Huertas’s friend in England; and (5) confiscated and returned to Huertas’s relatives an 
unspecified amount of funds they had sent to Huertas. 
 In rejecting Huertas’s retaliation claim, the District Court concluded that Huertas 
failed to present any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Henry was personally involved in the purportedly retaliatory mishandling of Huertas’s 
mail.  In reaching this conclusion, however, the District Court overlooked Huertas’s 
allegation -- supported by two fellow inmates’ affidavits -- that, on one occasion, Henry 
responded to Huertas’s inquiry about missing photographs by stating that Huertas would 
not get his photographs if he continued filing grievances.  See D. Ct. Doc. No 4, 4, 12; D. 
Ct. Doc. No. 71-2, 39.  The affidavits, along with Huertas’s deposition testimony, were 
arguably sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether 
Henry engaged in retaliatory conduct. 
6 
 
 Even so, the record presents a separate basis to affirm the District Court’s 
decision.  That is, assuming arguendo personal involvement by Henry, the purported 
conduct -- interfering with Huertas’s personal mail, confiscating his photographs, and 
interfering with his receipt of funds -- was not sufficiently adverse to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from pursuing grievances.  Simply put, more serious conduct is 
required to make out a retaliation claim under § 1983.
3
  Compare Haynes v. Stephenson, 
588 F.3d 1152, 1156 (8th Cir. 2009) (filing of a disciplinary charge in retaliation for 
inmate filing a grievance is adverse for purposes of § 1983 claim), Rauser, 241 F.3d at 
333 (inmate presented evidence of adverse retaliatory conduct where he showed “that he 
was denied parole, transferred to a distant prison where his family could not visit him 
regularly, and penalized financially” when his prison employment pay grade was reduced 
to the lowest possible level), and Allah, 229 F.3d at 225-26 (inmate sufficiently alleged 
adverse retaliatory conduct, where he claimed he was placed in administrative 
                                                 
3
  We note that, in an order dated November 21, 2011, we instructed the parties to 
address in their briefs this very issue.  To his credit, Huertas complied with our 
instruction, although the primary case upon which he relies, Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 
F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2010), is readily distinguishable.  In Hawkins, the district 
court was presented with a situation that was considerably more serious than that 
faced by Huertas -- Hawkins, a female inmate, alleged that she was raped and 
impregnated by a guard; she alleged that after she filed charges against the officer 
involved, other officers not only withheld incoming mail, but they withheld outgoing 
mail to the courts and to attorneys from whom she sought representation.  See id. at 
441-43.   
 
 On the other hand, and regrettably, the Attorney General’s Office, representing 
Henry, neglected our briefing instruction altogether.   
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segregation and confined to his cell for all but five hours per week, which severely 
limited his access to the commissary, recreation, rehabilitative programs, and legal 
research materials and assistance), with Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (a misconduct charge against a prisoner -- which was later dismissed -- for 
filing a false report was not sufficiently adverse to serve as the basis of a retaliation 
action), and Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325-26  (5th Cir. 1999) (change in 
prisoner’s employment, which limited his access to the prison law library to five hours 
per week, was not adverse for purposes of a retaliation claim).  No reasonable jury could 
find that the acts alleged here were sufficiently serious to deter a person of ordinary 
firmness from exercising his rights. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
